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Endangered species conservation is a serious global problem, with 
species facing increasing pressure from competition for land, from 
direct exploitation, and from a lack of effective management.  It is 
virtually certain that we will continue to lose large numbers of 
species in the next century, but we do have the ability to choose 
particular species and ecosystems to be targeted for preservation.  
If we are to save these endangered species, it is important to 
understand the key causes of extinction as well as the incentives 
that cause human behaviour to induce extinction of some species. 
 
In this research, a model is developed highlighting the key 
economic factors that are influential in determining the fate of an 
endangered species. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of 
non-consumptive values as a key component of species’ survival.  
The authors demonstrate that, in many cases, some existence 
value must be appropriated to the resource in order for extinction 
to be avoided.  Although the authors use the specific case of the 
African elephant in this paper, the results are applicable to a wide 
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Part 1.   Introduction 
The modelling of endangered species has principally grown out of 
the literature of fisheries economics. Clark (1973) based his model 
of species extinction on Gordon’s (1954) seminal fisheries model 
in order to examine the conditions under which extermination of a 
species may appear to be the most attractive policy to a resource 
owner. This forms the foundation for most of the work on species 
extinction that has followed. More recently, Swanson (1994) 
examined ways of adapting this model to terrestrial species by 
generalising the model in a similar conceptual structure. 
Swanson (1994) also provides a conceptual framework for the 
economics of extinction that considers the elimination of species 
as a product of human choice. He points out that mankind has a 
portfolio, as it were, of productive assets and that we substitute 
between those assets through a process of investment and 
disinvestment. Extinction is seen as a complete disinvestment of a 7 
wildlife resource which occurs because it is perceived as not being 
worthy of investment. (See also Swanson and Barbier 1992.) 
Both the Clark and Swanson models address consumptive use of 
the endangered species, but provide no means by which non-
consumptive values may act to the benefit of the species. Yet non-
consumptive values are large and may even exceed consumptive 
values (Swanson and Barbier 1992; Barnes 1996). The general 
objective of this research is to develop a model of endangered 
species management, based on the objectives of the various 
interested agents, in order to examine the impacts of their 
decisions on the decline of populations.  
More specifically, the objectives are first, to examine the causes 
of a species’ decline toward extinction in the general framework 
of Clark and Swanson. Second, to reconcile the  nature of the 
differences between the values received by the resource owner as 
reflected in those models, and the total value placed on the 
resource by the global society. And third, to develop a model to 
examine the magnitude of the unappropriated values that would be 
necessary to make long-term sustainable populations of a given 
endangered species bioeconomically viable. Although the African 
elephant is used as the basis for this model, the concepts contained 8 
herein are fully transferable to other species of similar 
characteristics. 
In Part 2, we examine the Clark and Swanson models, particularly 
the policy implications of the results. In Part 3, we develop a 
conceptual model with which to illustrate the existence and 
character of the values to be developed. In Part 4, we discuss the 
implications of the new model extensions for policies of 
endangered species management. Finally, in Part 5, we offer some 
final remarks and conclusions. 9 
Part 2.   Models of the economics of extinction 
The Clark Model 
The Clark  model explains the possible extinction of species as 
resulting from three factors: 1) open access to the resource, which 
results in overexploitation and driving economic rents to zero; 2) 
the relationship between price and marginal cost of harvesting the 
resource; and 3) the growth rate of the resource relative to the 
discount rate (Clark 1973). (See also, Clark 1976; Clark and 
Munro 1978; Clark et al. 1979.) If either the first condition or the 
last two conditions are met, then resource extinction may result. 
The first condition is not further considered here, but is discussed 
in both Clark (1973) and Swanson (1994). Regarding the last two 
conditions, Clark states, “if price always exceeds unit cost, and if 
the discount rate…is sufficiently large, then maximization of 
present value results in extermination of the resource”. Clark’s 
‘large discount rate’ is equivalent to a resource’s ‘low growth 10 
rate’ as the terms are relative to each other. It is the latter 
interpretation that we shall focus on in this paper. 
The Clark model posits a societal objective of maximising the 
appropriable income from its natural assets as follows. 
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where x(t) is the population of the endangered species in time t, 
h(t) is the harvest of the species in time t, p(h(t)) is the inverse 
demand curve defined as a function of harvest, c(x(t)) is the unit 
cost of harvest as a function of the stock level,  F(x(t)) is the 
growth function of the resource as a function of stock, and d is the 
marginal returns to capital in the society. For notational 
convenience, the time notation will subsequently be omitted, but 
will be understood to be implicit in all control and state variables. 
We follow Swanson’s (1994) interpretation of the Clark model, 
rather than Clark’s original, as the form is better suited for 
comparison with the model developed in this paper. 
To maximise its investment in this resource as well as in the other 
resources available, society will wish to maintain an asset 11 
portfolio that balances the level of each resource against other 
productive opportunities. The condition associated with optimal 
harvest ( h*) is shown in equation (2) and that associated with 
optimal stock levels (x*) is shown in equation (3).   
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where  l is the shadow value of the resource, and  ed is the 
elasticity of demand for the resource. 
Equation (3) represents a modified form of the  golden rule 
equation common in renewable resource models. Without 
modification, this  golden rule would indicate that  the resource 
must be maintained at a stock level such that the marginal 
productivity of the renewable resource stock, F¢(x), equates to the 
returns to capital available to the resource owner, d. 
This relationship may be viewed in terms of the Clark model as 
suggesting that if  F¢(x)< d for all population levels,  x, then 
extinction will result as the model’s optimum strategy for the 12 
resource owner. Only if F¢(x)=d at some positive population level 
do incentives exist for a positive equilibrium population to 
survive. This relationship makes clear the dilemma of slow-
growth species competing in developing countries against fast-
growth investment opportunities. Modifications to the golden rule 
equation may hinder or help the slow-growth species as it is 
required to ‘pay its way’ as a competitive resource. 
The modifications to that relationship in equation (3) take into 
account the stock-dependency of the harvest, indicating that costs 
increase as stocks decline. This acts to further lower the effective 
marginal productivity of the stock relative to the discount rate. A 
species’ adjusted growth must then achieve a rate of growth equal 
to the discount rate, placing even more pressure on the trend 
toward extinction. 
The policy implications of the Clark model are clear. Since we 
cannot change the resource growth rate, and since artificial 
discount rate distortions are an infeasible tool for resource 
management, changes must be initiated through adjustments to 
either the unit price received for the resource, the unit cost of 
harvesting the resource, or both. Specifically, to preserve a species 
for which the optimal financial solution is extinction, some 13 
combination must be enacted of lowering the unit price and 
raising the unit cost. Clark expresses this in terms of the cost/price 
ratio, with a ratio greater than 1.0 resulting in non-harvest, and 
therefore non-extinction, even when the resource growth rates are 
less than the rate of return on capital in the society (Clark, 1976). 
Swanson (1994) points out that this is the  basis for the ‘rent 
destruction’ policies exacted in response to the rapid decline of 
African elephant populations in the 1980s. It was estimated that 
between 1979 and 1989 the population of African elephants 
declined from 1,343,340 to 609,000, a loss of more than half the 
entire population (Douglas-Hamilton 1989). During a similar 
timeframe, from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, the volume of 
the ivory trade nearly doubled from 550 tonnes to 1,000 tons 
annually (Barbier et al. 1990). It was predicted that if those trends 
continued, extinction of the species would result within 20 years 
(Renewable Resources Assessment Group, 1989). 
The policy response was that the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) moved the African 
elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I, effectively prohibiting 
all international trade in ivory. This response is entirely consistent 
with the Clark model. The ban reduces the unit price of ivory to 14 
near zero by eliminating demand and simultaneously increases the 
unit cost of supplying ivory due to the legal barriers it imposes. 
Conceptually, the move of the African elephant to Appendix I 
may be viewed as an attempt to drive the cost/price ratio over 1.0. 
It has been generally successful in achieving the goals of no ivory 
trade and short-term cessation of rapid population decline (Barnes 
1996). 
This type of policy has some problems, however. Dependence on 
the cost/price ratio, where the discount rate exceeds the resource 
growth rate, limits policies to an all-or-nothing option. That is, 
any cost/price ratio less than 1.0 results in an outcome of optimal 
extinction, while any cost/price ratio greater than 1.0 results in no 
trade in the resource. Thus, positive sustainable trade is not an 
option. 
In some respects, this may not seem like a bad idea. Many 
conservationists and biologists, like Douglas-Hamilton, argue 
strongly that the only way to preserve the African elephant from 
extinction brought on by overexploitation in support of the ivory 
trade, is to ban the trade  altogether (Douglas-Hamilton and 
Douglas-Hamilton 1992). This argument overlooks the slower, but 
equally certain, decline of elephants—in fact, of all endangered 15 
species—due to unsuccessful competition for the limited land 
resources controlled by humans. This issue is addressed at greater 
length below. 
Further, as ivory is the principal valuable harvest resource of the 
elephant, eliminating all markets for ivory also acts to remove one 
of the major incentives for protecting the species. Desperately 
needed r evenues that were formerly used for the protection of 
elephants are no longer available. This reduces the value of the 
stock and renders it less able to compete against alternative uses 
of the land. This is demonstrated in Part 3. Swanson (1993) also 
discusses this issue at some length. (See also, Swanson and 
Barbier 1992.) 
The Swanson Model 
In his 1994 paper, Swanson proposes generalisations to Clark’s 
fishery-based model by including terrestrial resources required for 
endangered species survival. Swanson  points out that while 
humans do not compete for many of the ocean resources used by 
marine species, they do compete for the same land-based 
resources used by terrestrial endangered species. Thus, he argues 
that terrestrial species must not only generate growth in value to 
compete with other capital opportunities, they must also generate 16 
growth in value to compete with the opportunity costs of the 
resources they need for survival. 
To address this, Swanson adds another control variable to the 
problem, which r epresents the land resources allocated to a 
species as shown in equation (4) below. 
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where R is a unit of terrestrial resources upon which the species 
depends for survival, and rR is the price of a base unit of that land 
resource. This formulation removes the implicit assumption in 
fisheries-based models that required resources are free goods that 
do not require investment. This generates one of Swanson’s 







d =  
Similar in concept to the golden rule equilibrium discussed above, 
this condition requires that land-based resources be allocated to a 
species only in proportion to its ability to generate a competitive 17 
return. Note that this condition is in addition to the ones shown in 
equations (2) and (3) above. When taken together, these condi-
tions offer some further insight into the issues surrounding species 
extinction. In particular, through this new condition, we note that, 
even when Clark’s conditions are not met—that is either when 
growth rates are greater than the discount rate or when unit price 
is less than unit cost—we can still see a species move toward 
extinction if it does not provide a competitive return to the natural 
resources it requires for survival.
1 
Most compelling, for our purposes, is one of Swanson’s general 
conclusions. Referring back to the policy of rent destruction, he 
argues that those policies cannot save a species from extinction; 
they can only shift the species onto a different path to extinction. 
He adds, “the only policies that can alter the ultimate fate 
accorded by human society to any particular species are those that 
address the fundamental cause of decline: perceived investment-
unworthiness” (Swanson 1994, p. 819). 
                                                 
1 Swanson also introduced a similar condition requiring returns to management 
services, which is not considered here. 18 
Part 3.   Evaluating non-consumptive values 
A key characteristic of both the Clark and Swanson models is that 
each considers only the consumptive value of the endangered 
species.
2 That is, the stock must be harvested for any benefits to 
be realised. Yet some of the largest potential and realised benefits 
of the African elephant are non-consumptive. In Kenya alone, 
tourism generates revenues of about US$400 million per year 
(Pierce 1995), mostly related to wildlife and wilderness 
experiences. The consumers’ surplus of tourists visiting Kenya’s 
wildlife reserves has been estimated at between US$46 million 
and US$450 million per year (Pearce 1995).  
Barnes (1996) demonstrated that the non-consumptive value of 
the elephant is becoming increasingly important. Prior to the ban 
on ivory trade, 44 percent of the potential use value of elephants 
                                                 
2 Swanson does, at one point, identify the benefits as a more general ‘flow of 
social benefits’, but they are still expressed as a function of harvest. 19 
in Botswana was derived from non-consumptive uses, but that the 
figure has risen to 77 percent following the ban. 
Appropriability of these values is a problem, however. Of the 
$400 million in Kenyan tourism revenues, only $13 million, or 3 
percent, is appropriated by the Kenyan Wildlife Service for 
management of the wildlife (Pearce 1995). It has been suggested 
that considerable a dditional appropriations could be achieved 
simply through increased gate fees at reserves. However such 
increased appropriations might be achieved, it is sufficient for our 
purposes to note that wildlife appropriates a very small proportion 
of the tourism use value it generates. 
In addition to non-consumptive use values expressed through 
tourism, significant existence values of the elephant are 
demonstrated through memberships in various conservation 
societies. Actual studies on existence values of elephants are 
scarce,
3 and the worldwide existence value of the elephant is 
unknown, but it is probably safe to suggest that it is considerable, 
and that it would provide additional incentives to include 
elephants in the asset portfolio of the human species if it were 
                                                 
3 Some isolated studies do exist, however. For example, Dixon and Sherman 
(1990) estimated total economic value of elephants and other wildlife in 
Thailand at US$4.7 million per year. 20 
appropriated by the resource owners. The lack of existence value 
appropriation may well be the principle reason we see the decline 
of many species, such as the African elephant, that are highly 
regarded and valued by people around the world.  
There are many structural reasons why existence values are not 
appropriated, and they are not easy to overcome. Existence values 
are non-rival in consumption and non-excludable, and thus are 
classified economically as public goods. By ‘non-rival in 
consumption’, we mean that the enjoyment one person receives 
from the existence of elephants does nothing to diminish the 
enjoyment of another; that is, the good is not ‘used up’ through 
consumption. By ‘non-excludable’, we mean the level of an 
endangered species’ existence at any given time is the same for all 
people. Thus, you cannot exclude a non-paying person from 
experiencing the knowledge that elephants exist. As with all 
public goods, there is no incentive for any given individual to pay 
the value they receive and such a good is typically under-supplied 
without government intervention. 
If the good in question, and those benefiting from it, were all 
contained within a single government jurisdiction, this problem 
could be solved in the traditional way. The government would tax 21 
all of its members, perhaps weighted by some criterion such as the 
ability to pay, and then the government itself would provide the 
good. This works for such traditional examples of public goods as 
lighthouses, police protection and national defence. 
The problem of species extinction, however, is complicated by its 
global nature. Most of the world’s biological diversity is 
concentrated in a small number of states (McNeely et al. 1990). 
Those countries are generally poor and are in dire need of 
appropriable income, while the bulk of the non-consumptive 
values of endangered species arise out of the relatively wealthy 
developed nations. There is no mechanism in place to transfer 
income from those who benefit to those who are asked to bear the 
costs.
4  
Of the two non-consumptive values we have identified—tourism 
use values and non-use existence values—clearly the latter is the 
more difficult to appropriate in practice. Although a closer 
examination of policy alternatives is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it may be instructive to examine the impacts inclusion of 
                                                 
4 Some programmes exist which attempt to ‘tax’ wealthy nations to support 
wildlife and biodiversity conservation, such as the United Nations’ World 
Heritage Convention, but the level of support provided is minuscule when 
compared to the world’s conservation needs (Swanson and Barbier 1992). 22 
these values may have on the trend of a species toward extinction. 
Although we may not be able to solve the appropriation problem 
immediately, we may be able to design a framework within which 
it is possible to determine the appropriation necessary to make a 
particular species ‘pay for itself’. 
Consider the specific case of the African elephant in a particular 
jurisdiction. The objective of society in terms of value 
appropriated may be expressed with the following objective and 
constraint. 
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and the usual transversality and boundary conditions. 
PM(h) is an inverse demand function for the non-ivory products of 
harvest, gM is the average yield of non-ivory products per animal, 
PI(h) is an inverse demand function for ivory, gI is the average 23 
yield of ivory per animal, PS(h) is an inverse demand function for 
safari hunting,  PU is the unit price of one tourist-day,  U(x) is 
tourist-days as a function of population, N(x) is the non-market 
existence value of elephants as a function of population, PR is the 
unit value of land resources used by elephants, Rx is quantity of 
land resources used by elephants as a constant proportion  of 
population, and all other terms are as previously defined in Part 2.  
Note that, unlike Swanson, we do not characterise land resources 
given to elephants as a control variable as we find it unlikely that 
resource managers will have sufficient control of those resources 
to act on the results of these models. Rather, we suggest that if the 
correct incentives are put in place in society, including the 
appropriations that are the focus of this model, such transfers of 
land resources from alternative uses will arise through the market. 
For the purposes of this exposition, we offer some simplifications 
to the model to aid the transparency of the result. We assume that 
M M P h P = ) (  (constant), that  I I P h P = ) (  (constant), that  S S P h P = ) (  
(constant), and that  1 = = I M g g . This removes some terms that are 
not needed for understanding the features of the model, but which 
would be useful for developing a numerical solution. 24 
With the simplifications in place, the societal objective with 
regard to elephants is shown in equation (7). 
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Using the Pontryagin necessary conditions for maximisation of 
this problem, we derive the new version  of the  golden rule 
equation, analogous to that shown in equation (3). This condition 




) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) (
x C P P P





¢ + ¢ + - ¢ -
+ ¢ = d  
Recall that the LHS and the first term on the RHS indicate that the 
resource must be maintained at a stock level such that the 
marginal productivity of the renewable resource stock,  F¢(x), 
equates to the returns to capital available to the resource owner, d, 
and that all other terms on the RHS modify that relationship. 
The modifications take into account the stock-dependent terms of 
the original objective function, all expressed proportionately to the 25 
unit net revenue of harvesting the resource. The negative terms on 
the right side of equation (8) act to further lower the effective 
marginal productivity of the stock and the positive terms act to 
increase it. As in Clark’s model, the first term,  -C¢(x)F¢(x), 
represents the stock-dependent harvest costs. A species’ growth 
must then accommodate a rate of growth equal to the discount rate 
after this adjustment is made, placing even more pressure on the 
trend toward extinction. 
Similarly, the second term on the RHS shows the return for the 
foregone land required to sustain the elephant. This is one of the 
key points offered by Swanson in his generalisation of Clark’s 
extinction model; that is, the elephant must compete for the land 
resource that sustains it against the next best opportunity available 
for that land. The returns from the harvest must also cover these 
costs. 
The two positive terms in equation (8) reflect the non-
consumptive values of the elephant. These terms act to increase 
the effective returns from the population of elephants, but both 
terms are non-consumptive in that they do not require the harvest 
of an animal to be realised. The third term on the RHS is the 
marginal revenue from tourism. This is one way in which the total 26 
value people place on elephants is expressed in the market. These 
revenues act to support the existence of the elephant as it 
competes against other opportunities in society. 
The fourth term on the RHS is the marginal existence value, aside 
from any use value (either harvest or tourism) that people place on 
knowing that the elephant species continues. As used in this 
model, it actually represents the marginal existence value that is 
appropriated by the resource owner. 27 
Part 4.   Implications for species extinction 
A closer examination of the modification terms may be instructive 
in understanding the implications of this model. The ban on ivory 
trade has created a value of PI that is effectively zero. The impact 
of that change is to increase the net impact of the modification 
whether negative or positive; that is, the value of each 
modification is proportionately more important. If the combined 
values of stock-dependent costs and returns to land resource use 
outweigh those of tourism and existence value revenues—a 
condition that is almost certainly the case in many populations, as 
will be addressed below—then the loss of ivory revenues acts to 
the detriment of elephant conservation. This is a point that 
economists have attempted to make throughout the debate on the 
CITES ban. 
Increasing marginal tourism revenues,  PUU¢(x), acts unambigu-
ously to the benefit of elephant conservation. Unfortunately it is 28 
unlikely that such revenues are sufficient to encourage additional 
investment in the elephant resource. Norton-Griffiths and Southey 
(1995) found that non-consumptive use values in Kenya are not 
sufficient to equal the opportunity costs of the land. In a similar 
result, Barnes (1996) found that non-consumptive use values are 
not sufficient to justify further investment in the elephant 
resources of Botswana. Within the context of this model, these 
results suggest that tourism revenues are less than the opportunity 
cost of land, PUU¢(x)<PRR. 
Despite its prominent place in this model, marginal existence 
value appropriated by the resource owners is virtually zero.
5 
Foregoing any consideration of the stock-dependent costs, if this 
is the case, then the negative terms of the RHS of equation (8) 
must outweigh the positive, and the loss of ivory revenues must be 
considered to be detrimental to elephant conservation. 
                                                 
5 Several conservation organisations, such as the WorldWide Fund for Nature, 
do contribute funds to projects in support of  elephant conservation. As the 
sources of these funds are from voluntary contributions from members who 
may never see an elephant, it may be argued that this is an appropriation of 
existence values. Unfortunately, such resources are so small relative to the 
other values involved that the magnitude may be considered close to zero for 
our purposes. 29 
More important for our purpose, this highlights the critical nature 
of existence values being appropriated to the resource owner on 
behalf of those who enjoy the public good of the elephants’ 
existence. This value can be characterised by manipulating equa-
tion (8) to isolate  N¢(x) then solving the resulting differential 
equation for N(x). 
To summarise the argument, recall that the equation must balance 
at some positive stock level for the elephant to avoid extinction. 
Now consider the variables we have to work with. 
The basic relationship is that the elephant growth rate must equal 
the rate of return on capital at some positive population level. 
With a particularly slow growing species like the elephant, this is 
unlikely. We cannot change the growth rate of the elephant and 
we cannot unilaterally force the discount rate lower, especially for 
the long term over which this problem is defined. Stock-
dependent costs act to the detriment of the elephant, but are based 
on biology and technology and are not something we can 
dramatically lower. Even if we were to bring this term to zero, 
which we could achieve by setting harvest to zero, it wouldn’t 
remove the competition for land resources. 30 
Competition for land resources acts to the detriment of elephant 
conservation and is substantial in magnitude. It is estimated that 
human populations will more than double in Africa over the next 
decade (Concar and Cole 1992), and this will only increase the 
opportunity cost of the land for which the elephant must compete. 
Not only can this not be changed, it poses the greatest long-term 
threat to the survival of the elephant. 
Price and cost policies cannot alter the basic relationship, although 
they can speed up or slow down the process of extinction. As 
Swanson (1994) expresses it, this can ‘shift the path’ of extinction 
but not prevent it. So we are left only with non-consumptive 
values as possible tools with which to balance the equation. We 
have already discussed how tourism values alone are insufficient 
to offset the opportunity cost of land resources, and this leaves 
only one option for preserving the African elephant: the 
appropriation of existence values. Extinction is inevitable if some 
means for such appropriation to occur is not found. This 
conclusion may well be generalised to many endangered species. 31 
Part 5.   Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to highlight the key economic factors 
which influence the fate of the elephant and to provide a 
theoretical basis for estimating the non-consumptive values 
required to be appropriated in order for the elephant to ‘pay its 
own way’ in our asset portfolio. 
All species of animals and all wilderness areas are now economic 
goods in the sense that they must compete for a place in 
mankind’s asset portfolio. It is estimated that global human 
populations will  double over the next century (Perman  et al. 
1996). This will significantly increase pressures to convert 
wildlands into food-producing areas and make it even harder for 
endangered species to compete. This continuing loss of habitat is 
probably the greatest threat facing endangered species. The 
African elephant is particularly threatened by these trends, as it 32 
requires a tremendous volume of land to sustain viable 
populations. 
Non-consumptive use values of the elephant are becoming 
increasingly important in acting to slow the population decline. 
However, tourism alone is insufficient to support increased 
investments in elephant conservation, so it is critical to the 
survival of the species that a way is found to appropriate the non-
consumptive, non-use existence value held by members of the 
wealthy industrialised societies. The relationship of these values 
to the other elements in the elephant conservation problem has 
been identified and the theoretical foundation provided for 
numerically approximating their magnitude. 
It is clear that the continued survival of the African elephant, and 
of many other endangered species, depends upon the ability of our 
global society to develop a mechanism for the transfer of value 
from those who desire the benefits of continuing existence to 
those who bear the cost of maintaining the species. 33 
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